Editor’s note: Reports of counterfeit components increased in 2023, according electronics information firm ERAI, to 786 suspect or nonconforming parts. The most commonly reported devices are analog ICs, microprocessors, memory and programmable logic ICs. In this second of two articles, Rochester Electronics’ Ken Greenwood outlines steps to mitigate the risk of procuring counterfeit chips. 

The approach to minimizing counterfeit risk is tripartite. Here, government enforcement, supplier practices and customer planning all play a role.

Government enforcement

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) enacted in 2012 was prompted by high-profile counterfeit semiconductor incidents in commercial and military applications. Component failures demonstrated how counterfeit devices could compromise national security and cause personal injury or death.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) enacted in 2012 was prompted by high-profile counterfeit semiconductor incidents in commercial and military applications.

Excerpts from the NDAA highlight the government’s intention to hold manufacturers responsible for the control of counterfeit components:

  1. Contractors who provide electronic parts or products containing electronic parts are responsible for detecting and preventing the use or inclusion of counterfeit or “suspect counterfeit” electronic parts in their products. They must also take corrective action or rework, if necessary, to address any such use or inclusion of such parts.
  2. The cost of counterfeit electronic parts and “suspect counterfeit” electronic parts are not allowable costs under department contracts. Additionally, rework or corrective action required to remedy the use or inclusion of such parts is also not allowable.

While this legislation sheds light on the challenge and makes manufacturers more responsible for controlling counterfeits of their products, it doesn’t necessarily make it easier for the end-user to recoup the costs and undo the damage from counterfeit goods.

Original component manufacturer enforcement

The industry currently employs several initiatives and methods in combating counterfeits. Educating companies and users about the risks posed lowers the chance of damage. The industry is also closely working with Customs and Border Protection, as well as other law enforcement agencies, to cut counterfeit supply chains and prosecute those involved. Finally, the industry is increasing security measures and developing international standards relating to supply chain assurance.

Rochester’s Ken Greenwood

While OCMs are not responsible for counterfeits of their products, many OCMs continue to sell surplus components into uncontrolled, unaccountable and unauthorized channels. This contributes to product uncertainty, potentially poor component quality downstream and damages their overall brand. Authorized sales control of surplus active and discontinued semiconductors is essential to differentiate guaranteed good products from counterfeits. In recent years, semiconductor manufacturers, such as Texas Instruments, have led this charge, eliminating authorized component sales to unauthorized sources. 

Customer responsibility

Counterfeit semiconductors are so pervasive throughout the supply chain, that regulation and enforcement have proven to be ineffectual in stemming their supply. Customers’ purchasing policies and controls are the best and most credible line of defense.

Policies to avoid counterfeits:

  • Only purchase products from the OCM or their authorized distributors and licensed manufacturers.
  • Purchasing from an authorized supplier that carries a full warranty for performance, quality, and reliability.
  • Ensure the supplier complies with the industry standard AS6496 for handling and preservation, with quality certifications as appropriate for the sale of the final component.
  • Employing a self-audit process, which analyses suspicious or poor-quality purchases, before putting robust corrective actions in place.
  • Partnering with an authorized after-market manufacturer.
  • Choose a testing program that uses the original OCM’s test program.
  • Research authorized component distributors by visiting: https://www.eciaauthorized.com/en.

The role of testing in identifying counterfeits

Visual inspection under AS6081 and Electrical Testing AS6171, are the two most common methods of identifying counterfeits, but they may both be unreliable for identifying counterfeit products for the following reasons:

  • Paperwork and visual inspection are unlikely to identify professional counterfeit devices. Traceability documents and certificates are regularly forged to support the deception.
  • X-ray inspections are like to miss fraudulently up-screened, recovered-reused, or recovered-failed-test devices.
  • Basic continuity or functional testing will not identify the fraudulently up-screened or recovered and reused devices.
  • 3rd-party functional testing (predominantly focused on the datasheet attributes) – datasheets provide only a subset of the characteristics tested by the OCM and may not be carried out over the full temperature range.

One of the other issues with “authenticity” testing is that it is not always possible to test every component in a shipment due to time and cost constraints. In many cases, counterfeiters strategically place viable components at the beginning and end of reels and tubes, which are the most likely components to be tested, to pass the authenticity test.

The best test program is the one created by the OCM. Other tests conducted by 3rd-parties will not be as robust, nor comprehensive. Their reliability is questionable. When functionally testing a device, fault coverage is critical. Without 100 percent test fault coverage, the device may have residual failures. Residual failures are devices that contain faults but pass testing.

Effective testing requires high fault coverage and accurate fault modeling.Effective testing requires high fault coverage and accurate fault modeling. The most basic MCU test, as carried out by the OCM, comprises 100,000 development hours. AS6171 demands greater testing for parts bought through independent distribution, but these tests only cover a tiny number of the parameters within the OCM test.

The only 100 percent guarantee that a device operates to specifications, is to test it using the OCM’s test processes.

Fully authorized semiconductor distributors, such as Rochester Electronics, are compliant with the SAE Aerospace Standard, AS6496. Simply stated, they are authorized by the OCM to provide traceable and guaranteed products with no quality or reliability testing required because the parts are only sourced from the OCM.

Providers who are not fully authorized may market themselves as AS6171/4-compliant. This indicates that they do follow standardized inspections and test procedures but may have minimum training and certification requirements to detect suspicious or counterfeit components. If AS6171 testing is being done, it means the product is not being tested to the original OCM test program. OCM test programs test significantly beyond datasheet parameters and are meant to filter products for no failures even when there are millions of units sold. AS6171 testing is not equivalent to OCM testing.

The ultimate tool in the fight to combat counterfeit products is purchasing semiconductor devices from fully authorized sources.

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