The US currently accounts for 57% of wafer demand but owns only 10% of foundry capacity.
Global foundry utilisation will remain at about 70%, with growth heavily dependent on demand.
Governments worldwide have launched significant subsidy programs to re-localise and fortify their semiconductor infrastructure.
“Taiwan controls 23% of global foundry capacity but accounts for only 4% of wafer demand,” says Yole’s Pierre Cambou, “South Korea with players is mostly satisfying its domestic demand with an equal share of global capacity and wafer demand at 19%.”
Mainland China is rapidly becoming a central player. In 2024, it held 21% of foundry capacity despite generating just 5% of global wafer demand.
Much of this excess capacity is either foreign-owned or offered as open foundry services, although utilisation rates remain below the global average.
By 2030, China is projected to dominate the global foundry landscape, accounting for 30% of installed capacity, outpacing Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.
Europe and Japan are holding steady in terms of the supply-demand balance, though much of their foundry capacity is tied to their own internal market.
The Southeast Asian region, especially Singapore and Malaysia, owns 6% of global foundry capacity, although it lacks domestic players and therefore operates entirely on foreign-owned foundries.
Despite fears of over-investment, Yole Group forecasts that the 4.3% CAGR in foundry capacity will not result in severe overcapacity. Global utilisation is expected to hover around 70% through 2030.
This relatively low utilisation rate will become the new normal. Without a corresponding surge in wafer production and end-market demand, the return on these capital-intensive expansions may fall short.
“The foundry market is more of a capitalistic game than a product competition,” says Cambou,. “ownership, location, and utilisation must now be read through national interests, economic security, and long-term technology strategy.”
While U.S.-based players still control roughly 20% of global capacity, 10% locally and 10% abroad, China’s domestic players are rapidly expanding own local capacity from 15% in 2024 to significantly more by 2030.
This growing divergence between where capacity is built and who owns it points to future uncertainties in market access, supply chain transparency, and strategic leverage.
There’s a clear geographical overweight toward Asia, and that will only deepen. The global foundry market will be decided less by where fabs are located and more by who owns them.
The semiconductor foundry industry is entering a decisive decade. With geopolitical tension, regional capacity expansions, and ownership battles shaping its trajectory, the path forward will be driven much more by the demand-side dynamics than by the investment capacity, which is already overwhelming
